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Abstract 
As a result of Daubert, trial judges were advised to only admit an expert once they 
determine 1) that the testimony is supported with scientific evidence and 2) would assist the 
trier(s) of fact.  The present studies were designed to address the second criterion of 
admissibility by 1) assessing jurors knowledge of eyewitness memory, and 2) determining if 
they can apply this knowledge when assessing mock courtroom testimony. In the first study, 
subjects evaluated trial transcripts of testimony concerning an eyewitness account where factors 
that influence eyewitness memory were present in either a negative form or a positive form. In 
the second study subjects evaluated testimony in transcripts that described factors in a negative, 
positive, or omitted form. Subjects in both experiments also answered survey questions (adapted 
from Kassin et al., 2001) to assess their personal beliefs regarding eyewitness memory issues. 
Results suggest jurors appear to be sensitive to many factors that influence eyewitness memory 
in both the survey format and the trial transcripts. In particular, performance on the trial 
transcripts suggests that potential jurors may be more sensitive to a number of eyewitness 
memory issues than would be implied by the results of prior survey research.   The implications 
of these findings are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Eyewitness testimony is often the most incriminating evidence against a defendant in 
court and has been responsible for more wrongful convictions than any other type of evidence 
(Lindsay, 1999). In fact, of the first 40 cases of wrongful convictions overturned due to DNA 
evidence, 90% involved eyewitnesses who falsely identified the defendant (Wells, Small, 
Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, & Brimacombe, 1998). One potential safeguard against wrongful 
convictions due to mistaken identifications is the use of expert testimony to educate jurors about 
the limitations of eyewitness memory.  
The admissibility of scientific evidence, including expert testimony, was originally 
addressed in the 1923 case, Frye v. United States. The recommended criteria for admissibility 
included the notion that there be general acceptance among experts in the field that the evidence 
is valid. More recently in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), the United 
States Supreme Court recommended that trial judges should determine admissibility of expert 
testimony based on two criteria. First, judges must determine if the scientific evidence is 
supported with valid research and second, if the evidence would assist the trier(s) of fact.  
However, because judges may not be familiar with scientific evidence in all fields, they may still 
admit expert testimony if there is general acceptance among experts in that particular field that 
the research is valid.  
In order to assess general acceptance among eyewitness memory experts, Kassin, 
Ellsworth, & Smith (1989) and more recently, Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon (2001) surveyed 
experts for their views on statements concerning the accuracy of eyewitness memory. The 
experts were asked to characterize the reliability of the scientific evidence supporting each 
statement. Topics and statements used in these studies are presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1  
Topics and statements used in Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith (1989) and Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon (2001). 
 
Topics 
 
Statements 
 
Stress a 
 
Very high levels of stress impair the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. 
 
Weapon focus a The presence of a weapon impairs an eyewitnesss ability to accurately identify 
the perpetrators face. 
 
Showups a The use of a one-person showup instead of a multiple person lineup increases 
the risk of misidentification. 
 
Lineup fairness a The more members of a lineup resemble the suspect, the higher the likelihood 
that identification of the suspect is accurate. 
 
Lineup instructions a Police instructions can affect an eyewitnesss willingness to make an 
identification. 
 
Exposure time a The less time an eyewitness has to observe an event, the less he or she will 
remember. 
 
Forgetting curve a The rate of memory loss for an event is greatest right after the event and then 
levels off over time. 
 
Accuracy-confidence a An eyewitnesss confidence is not a good predictor of his or her identification 
accuracy. 
 
Postevent information a Eyewitness testimony about an event often reflects not only what they actually 
saw but information they obtained later. 
 
Color perception a Judgments of color made under monochromatic light (e.g., an orange 
streetlight) are highly unreliable.  
 
Wording of the questions a An eyewitnesss testimony about an event can be affected by how the questions 
put to that witness are worded. 
 
Unconscious transference a Eyewitnesses sometimes identify as a culprit someone they have seen in 
another situation or context. 
 
Trained observers a Police officers and other trained observers are more accurate as eyewitnesses 
than is the average person. 
 
Hypnotic accuracy b Hypnosis increases the accuracy of an eyewitness reported memory.  
 
Hypnotic retrieval c Hypnosis does not facilitate the retrieval of an eyewitness memory. 
 
Hypnotic suggestibility a Hypnosis increases suggestibility to leading and misleading questions.  
 
Attitudes and expectations a An eyewitnesss perception and memory for an event can be affected by his or 
her attitudes and expectations.  
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Table 1 Continued  
 
 
Topics Statements 
 
Event violence a 
 
Eyewitnesses have more difficulty remembering violent than nonviolent events. 
 
Cross-race bias a Eyewitnesses are more accurate when identifying members of their own race 
than members of other races. 
 
Confidence malleability b An eyewitnesss confidence can be influenced by factors that are unrelated to 
identification accuracy. 
 
Alcoholic intoxication b Alcoholic intoxication impairs an eyewitnesss later ability to recall persons and 
events. 
 
Mugshot induced bias b Prior exposure to mug shots of a suspect increases the likelihood that the 
witness will later choose that suspect in a lineup. 
 
Long term repression b Traumatic experiences can be repressed for many years and then recovered. 
 
False childhood memories b Memories people recover from their own childhood are often false or distorted 
in some way. 
 
Discriminability b It is possible to reliably differentiate between true and false memories. 
 
Child witness accuracy b Young children are less accurate as witnesses than are adults. 
 
Child suggestibility b Young children are more vulnerable than adults to interviewer suggestion, peer 
pressures, and other social influences. 
 
Description matched lineupb The more that members of a lineup resemble a witnesss description of the 
culprit, the more accurate an identification of the suspect is likely to be. 
 
Presentation format b  Witnesses are more likely to misidentify someone when presented with all 
lineup members at the same time (simultaneous lineup) as opposed to seeing 
one lineup member at a time (sequential lineup).  
 
Elderly witnesses b Elderly eyewitnesses are less accurate than younger adults. 
 
Identification speed b The more quickly a witness makes an identification upon seeing the lineup, the 
more accurate he or she is likely to be.   
 
Time estimation c 
 
Eyewitnesses tend to overestimate the duration of events. 
Sex differences c Women are better than men at recognizing faces. 
 
a Topics used in both studies.  
b Topics added in Kassin et al (2001) 
c Topics used only in Kassin et al (1989) 
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Kassin et al (2001) found that 80% or more of experts agreed that scientific evidence 
supporting the following factors that influence eyewitness memory have enough scientific 
evidence supporting them to merit expert testimony in the courtroom: the wording of the 
questions, lineup instructions, postevent information, confidence malleability, mugshot induced 
bias, child witness suggestibility, attitudes and expectations, hypnotic suggestibility, alcoholic 
intoxication, the cross race bias, weapon focus, the accuracy-confidence correlation, the 
forgetting curve, exposure time, presentation format, and unconscious transference.  Thus, there 
is substantial agreement among eyewitness memory experts about the scientific basis for a 
number of important issues. 
Despite this consensus, many eyewitness memory experts have not been allowed to 
testify in trials where their expertise might be relevant.  One commonly cited reason for 
inadmissibility pertains to judges assumption that the issues to be discussed would be common 
sense to most jurors (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, and Memon, 2001). To address this assumption, 
researchers have attempted to assess lay knowledge of eyewitness memory limitations. The 
general finding from these studies is that lay people appear to hold some beliefs about 
eyewitness memory that are inconsistent with scientific evidence. However, the exact issues 
sometimes vary from study to study. 
The most common method used to assess lay knowledge of eyewitness identification 
issues is the survey.   Specifically, respondents are asked whether they agree or disagree with 
various statements describing factors that may impact eyewitness memory. Survey studies 
generally conclude that the average person does not possess knowledge of many factors that 
influence eyewitness memory and therefore would benefit from expert testimony. However, a 
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closer examination of the results of survey studies reveals that participants appear to have 
knowledge for a number of these eyewitness identification issues. 
The first questionnaire used to survey lay knowledge was the Knowledge of Eyewitness 
Behavior Questionnaire (KEBQ) developed by Deffenbacher and Loftus (1982). This 
questionnaire contains 14 multiple-choice questions pertaining to eyewitness identification 
issues. Each question was followed by four alternative choices with one being the correct 
answer. Two of the issues (mug shot induced bias and cross race bias) were covered by two 
questions each, therefore this survey examined the following 12 eyewitness identification issues: 
the cross race bias, mug shot induced bias, event violence, face memory, trained observers, 
interrogation, stress, weapon focus, question wording, age, accuracy-confidence correlation, and 
time estimation. Explanations of these issues are presented in Table 2. 
Deffenbacher and Loftus (1982) administered the KEBQ to a sample composed of 
undergraduate students and people from the community. The authors found no significant 
differences between groups so the data for the two groups were combined. Using the criterion of 
at least 50% of the sample choosing the correct answer, they found that 56% to 86% of subjects 
accurately answered the questions concerning the cross race bias, stress, question wording, mug 
shot induced bias, and time estimation. However, only 16% to 48% of subjects accurately 
answered the questions concerning event violence, face memory, the accuracy-confidence 
correlation, weapon focus, trained observers, interrogation, age, and one of the cross race bias 
questions. These results indicate that potential jurors possess knowledge of 4 of these 12 
eyewitness identification issues.  
None and Hollin (1987) replicated a similar pattern of results using the KEBQ with a 
British sample composed of undergraduate students, law students, and older adults from the 
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community. The authors also found no significant differences between groups so the data for the 
three groups were combined. They found that 53% to 86% of subjects accurately answered the 
questions concerning the cross race bias, stress, weapon focus, question wording, mug shot 
induced bias, age, and time estimation. However, only 12% to 30% of subjects accurately 
answered the questions concerning event violence, face memory, the accuracy-confidence 
correlation, trained observers, interrogation, and one of the cross race bias questions. These 
results indicate that potential jurors possess knowledge of 6 of these 12 eyewitness identification 
issues.  
Seltzer, Lopes, and Venuti (1990) adapted the KEBQ by only examining 5 of the 12 
eyewitness identification issues from the KEBQ. The authors surveyed jurors who had just 
completed jury duty and found 55% of participants accurately answered the question concerning 
stress but only 13 % to 42% of participants correctly answered the questions concerning the 
cross race bias, event violence, trained observers, and the accuracy-confidence correlation. These 
findings suggest that jurors are not familiar with four of the five eyewitness identification issues 
covered in this study. The results from this study are consistent with previous studies that used 
the KEBQ. 
Overall the studies using the KEBQ listed above covered a number of eyewitness 
identification issues and highlight six issues that appear to be appropriate for expert testimony.  
Results from the above surveys are presented in Table 3. Although many of these studies used 
surveys that were developed by experts, they did not use instruments that had been given to both 
experts and lay people.  This limitation is important to note since one of the criteria of 
admissibility states that in order for an expert to testify there must be general acceptance in the 
field that the research is valid. Therefore, even if lay people do not possess knowledge of some 
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limitations of eyewitness memory, it is irrelevant if experts do not agree that the research 
examining these limitations is valid.  
 
Table 2 
 
Explanations of the Knowledge of Eyewitness Behavior Questionnaire (KEBQ) eyewitness identification 
issues. 
Topic Explanation 
 
Cross-race bias 
 
Eyewitnesses are more accurate when identifying members 
of there own race as opposed to identifying members of other 
races. 
 
Accuracy-confidence correlation An eyewitnesses confidence is not a predictor of 
identification accuracy. 
 
Mug shot induced bias  Exposing an eyewitness to a mug shot of the suspect 
increases the chances of the witness will later identify that 
suspect from a lineup. 
 
Event violence Eyewitnesses have better memory for nonviolent events as 
opposed to violent events. 
 
Face memory A face that is viewed only once will become 
indistinguishable from faces that have never been seen before 
after a period of several months.  
 
Trained observers Trained observers (such as police officers) are not better 
witnesses than the average person. 
 
Interrogation procedure Witnesses are less accurate and complete when asked 
specific questions as opposed to open-ended questions. 
 
Stress High levels of stress impair the accuracy of eyewitness 
memory.  
 
Weapon focus The presence of a weapon causes the witness to focus on the 
weapon and would interfere with his/her ability to remember 
the perpetrators face.  
  
Question wording A witness account of an event can be influenced by how the 
investigating police officer words the questions.  
 
Age Ability to recognize previously seen faces increases steadily 
to early adulthood and then declines after age 60.  
 
Time estimation Witnesses often over estimate the duration of the crime. 
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Table 3 
Authors conclusions regarding lay knowledge of eyewitness memory issues on the KEBQ. Percentages 
of correct responses are noted in parenthesis.  
 
 
 
Topic 
Deffenbacher & 
Loftus (1982) 
 
None & Hollin 
(1987) 
Seltzer, Lopes, 
& Venuti (1990) 
Question wording 
 
Accurate (86) Accurate (86) n/a 
Stress 
 
Accurate (82) Accurate (68) Accurate (55) 
Time estimation 
 
Accurate (68) Accurate (55) n/a 
Mug shot induced bias  
 
 
Accurate (61) 
Accurate (56) 
Accurate (67) 
Accurate (60) 
n/a 
 
Cross-race bias 
 
Accurate (56) 
Inaccurate (21) 
Accurate (75) 
Inaccurate (25) 
n/a 
Inaccurate (33) 
Age 
 
Inaccurate (48) Accurate (65) n/a 
Weapon focus 
 
Inaccurate (48) Accurate (53) n/a 
Accuracy-confidence 
correlation 
 
Inaccurate (28) Inaccurate (15) Inaccurate (36) 
Face memory 
 
Inaccurate (27) Inaccurate (30) n/a 
Event violence 
 
Inaccurate (24) Inaccurate (12) Inaccurate (13) 
Interrogation procedure 
 
Inaccurate (21) Inaccurate (16) n/a 
Trained observers  
 
Inaccurate (16) Inaccurate (25) Inaccurate (42) 
Note. Authors considered subjects accurate when 50% or more answered 
correctly 
 
In order to address this issue, Kassin and Barndollar (1992) developed a survey that used 
the 21 statements from the Kassin et al (1989) survey that assessed expert knowledge. The 
Kassin et al (1989) statements were used in order to directly compare students and community 
adults to eyewitness memory experts. This questionnaire had subjects indicate for each statement 
whether they believed it to be true or false. The authors found that there was no significant 
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difference between the students and community adults. Note that this finding is consistent with 
the Deffenbacher and Loftus (1982) and None and Hollin (1987) studies which also found no 
significant differences between students and community adults.   
Kassin and Barndollar (1992) also found that 80% or more of both groups agreed with 
the statements pertaining to identification issues such as the wording of the questions, attitudes 
and expectations, and the effects of stress on accuracy. Chi-square tests revealed that subjects 
(students and community adults) and the experts significantly differed on 13 of the 21 issues 
such as lineup fairness, lineup instructions, show-ups, and exposure time.  Thus, the authors 
conclude that expert testimony may be needed for many of these issues. 
Recent studies have examined the relationship between agreement by experts on a more 
recent version of the survey (Kassin et al., 2001) and the knowledge expressed by lay people.  
Read (2004) surveyed Canadian community adults for their views on 29 of the 30 statements 
used in Kassin et al. (2001). Similarly, Lane and Alonzo (2004) used 26 of the 30 statements 
with an undergraduate student sample in Louisiana. Both studies found agreement of 80% or 
more for issues such as wording of the questions, confidence malleability, post event 
information, attitudes and expectations, and alcoholic intoxication. Lane and Alonzo (2004) also 
found high agreement on the issue regarding mugshot-induced bias (Read, 2004 did not include 
this issue on the survey). Read (2004) also found agreement of 80% or more for the issues 
concerning lineup instructions, child suggestibility, accuracy-confidence correlation, exposure 
time, and unconscious transference.   Using 80% agreement as a threshold, a comparison 
between the two studies reveals that there are a number of issues on which potential jurors are in 
agreement with experts.   However, the difference between these studies suggests that this 
 10  
agreement could vary according to geography or other demographic differences. Results from 
these three studies are presented in table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
 
Percentage of agreement ratings. Experts agreement ratings from Kassin et al 
(2001) are noted in parenthesis. 
Opinions Concerning Eyewitness Identification Topics 
 Agree Statement is True 
Topic Kassin & 
Barndollar 
(1992) 
Read  
(2004) 
Lane & Alonzo  
(2004) 
Wording of questions (98) 90 96 93 
Lineup instructions (98) 68 88 67 
Confidence malleability (95) n/a 86 85 
Mug-shot-induced bias (94) n/a n/a 83 
Postevent information (94) 75 92 92 
Child suggestibility (92) n/a 93 79 
Attitudes & expectations (91) 89 92 97 
Alcoholic intoxication (90) n/a 93 97 
Hypnotic suggestibility (91) 46 72 n/a 
Cross-race bias/general (90) 
Cross-race bias/White a 
Cross-race bias/Black a 
n/a 
58 
22 
75 
n/a 
n/a 
43 
n/a 
n/a 
Weapon focus (87) 60 77 52 
Accuracy-confidence (87) 49 88 64 
Forgetting curve (83) 41 51 n/a 
Exposure Time (81) 37 82 52 
Presentation format (81) n/a n/a 30 
Unconscious transference (81) 65 91 72 
 
Showups (74) 
 
63 
 
86 
 
62 
Description-matched foils (71) n/a 76 40 
Child Accuracy (70) n/a 53 27 
Lineup fairness (70) 39 76 18 
False childhood memories (68) n/a 73 62 
Color perception (63) 46 n/a n/a 
Stress (60) 82 91 69 
Older witnesses (50) n/a n/a 38 
Hypnotic accuracy (45) n/a 65 n/a 
Identification speed (40) n/a 73 36 
Trained observers (39) 39 54 46 
Event violence (37) 28 68 23 
Discriminability (32) n/a 50 34 
Long-term repression (22) n/a 83 87 
Time estimation a 62 n/a n/a 
Hypnotic retrieval a 18 n/a n/a 
Sex differences a 24 n/a n/a 
a Topics used only in Kassin et al (1989). 
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Although survey research has revealed a number of interesting similarities and 
differences in knowledge between experts and lay people, this method of assessment raises other 
important questions.  For instance, even when there is high agreement among subjects regarding 
eyewitness memory issues on survey studies, the question remains as to whether jurors could use 
this knowledge to make appropriate judgments in the courtroom. Put another way, the question is 
whether potential jurors explicit beliefs (as assessed by surveys) are a good predictor of their 
ability to use this information to accurately assess the credibility of witnesses in the courtroom.  
Note that this issue also encompasses the question as to whether jurors might be sensitive to the 
topic in the courtroom, and yet not indicate this knowledge on their survey response.  
The general question of the utility of verbally expressed beliefs/knowledge for predicting 
later behavior has been explored in other paradigms.  For example, people do not always appear 
to use information in real-world problems they have acquired in other contexts (e.g., the 
classroom).  For example, studies of naïve physics have found that students who completed a 
college physics course did not transfer that knowledge when they encountered a real world 
problem that involved principles they had learned in class (McCloskey, Caramazza, and Green, 
1980). Another example comes from research on attitude-behavior consistency. In this paradigm 
many studies have found that expressed attitudes are often not consistent with later behavior 
(e.g., La Piere, 1934).  Finally, research has suggested that sometimes people are able to 
accurately perform a task even without explicit knowledge of how they perform the task (e.g., 
Reber, 1989).  Results from these various lines of research suggest that the survey method may 
not accurately assess eyewitness memory knowledge since endorsing a statement on a survey 
does not mean a person is able to properly use that knowledge to make a decision (nor does an 
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inaccurate survey response necessarily mean they would not make a correct assessment in the 
courtroom).  
The present study attempted to address this matter by first assessing undergraduate 
students ability to identify eyewitness identification issues in the context of courtroom 
testimony, which is how jurors are actually exposed to these issues. We then assessed 
participants understanding of eyewitness identification issues with the questionnaire used in 
Lane and Alonzo (2004). The courtroom testimony was developed around the statements used in 
the survey in order to directly compare performance on the two measures. Experiment 1 
examined the following 15 eyewitness identification issues from Kassin et al (2001): stress, 
weapon focus, lineup fairness, alcoholic intoxication, mugshot induced bias, post event 
information, confidence malleability, unconscious transference, exposure time, trained 
observers, accuracy confidence correlation, cross race bias, showups, description matched 
lineups, and lineup instructions.  
The present research examined the utility of the survey method by exploring the 
relationship between subjects performance on the survey with their performance on a measure 
that more accurately represents how jurors would be exposed to eyewitness identification issues.   
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Experiment 1 
Methods 
        Participants 
Sixty undergraduate students participated in this study. Participants were enrolled in an 
upper level psychology course at Louisiana State University. All subjects were volunteers and 
received extra credit for their participation. 
        Materials 
The materials for this study included a packet of trial transcripts of courtroom testimony 
and a questionnaire. The courtroom testimony packet consisted of five pages of transcript 
excerpts from five different mock cases. Each page had a brief description of a case followed by 
a transcript excerpt of courtroom testimony. The testimony was either directly from an 
eyewitness to a crime or from a police officer regarding an eyewitness.   
Four versions of each excerpt were developed. Each excerpt contained testimony 
pertaining to three eyewitness identification topics. For 13 of the 15 topics, the testimony 
regarding the eyewitness identification topics was in one of two forms: negative or 
neutral/positive. When in the negative form, the information suggests that this specific aspect of 
the viewing conditions should (according to experts) negatively affect the accuracy of the 
eyewitness. For example, when a weapon is present and the witness focuses on the weapon 
instead of the perpetrator, then the witnesss ability to identify the perpetrator may be impaired. 
When in the positive form the information suggests that this specific aspect of the viewing 
conditions was relatively ideal.  
For two of the topics, accuracy confidence correlation and trained observers, the 
testimony regarding these topics was in one of two forms: misleading or neutral/positive. When 
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in the misleading form, the subjects may think the information suggests that this specific aspect 
of the witness or the viewing conditions increases the accuracy of the witness but (according to 
experts) it should not. For example, subjects may view trained observers to be better witnesses 
than the average person even though research suggests this is not so. Therefore, when the 
testimony pertaining to the topic of trained observers is in the misleading form, subjects may rate 
an eyewitness who is a police officer as more accurate than the average person. When in the 
neutral/positive form, the subjects are not led to think this specific aspect has an effect on the 
accuracy of the witness.  
In 1 of the 4 versions of each excerpt, testimony for all topics was neutral/positive 
(considered the control version). For each of the other versions of each excerpt, testimony 
regarding one of the topics was problematic or misleading and neutral/positive for the other two. 
The design of the transcript excerpts is presented in Table 5 and an example of one of the 
excerpts is presented in Table 6.  
The topics covered in the transcripts were the same topics used in the questionnaire. The 
questionnaire is an adapted version of the Kassin et al (2001) survey, and contained 15 of the 
original 30 statements concerning the accuracy of eyewitness memory. The answer choices 
following each statement were modified slightly to make them more comprehensible to a lay 
audience. Each statement was followed by an instruction to characterize their beliefs regarding 
the statement. Each statement had three possible answers: true, false, or do not know. For 
example, for the statement The presence of a weapon impairs an eyewitnesss ability to 
accurately identify the perpetrators face, subjects were to indicate if they believed the 
statement to be true, false, or do not know. 
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Table 5:  
 
Design of the five transcript excerpts for Experiment 1. 
Transcript 
Excerpts 
(Cases) 
Versions 
 Group A Group B Group C Group D 
1 Stress (-) 
Weapon  
Focus (+) 
Lineup  
Fairness (+) 
 
Stress (+) 
Weapon  
Focus (-) 
Lineup  
Fairness (+) 
Stress (+) 
Weapon  
Focus (+) 
Lineup  
Fairness (-) 
Stress (+) 
Weapon  
Focus (+) 
Lineup  
Fairness (+) 
CONTROL 
 
2 Cross Race  
Bias (+) 
Showup (+) 
Alcohol  
Intoxication (+) 
CONTROL 
 
Cross Race  
Bias (-) 
Showup (+) 
Alcohol  
Intoxication (+) 
Cross Race  
Bias (+) 
Showup (-) 
Alcohol  
Intoxication (+) 
Cross Race  
Bias (+) 
Showup (+) 
Alcohol  
Intoxication (-) 
3 Mugshot  
Bias (-) 
Description 
Matched Lineup (+) 
Lineup  
Instructions (+) 
 
Mugshot  
Bias (+) 
Description 
Matched Lineup (+) 
Lineup  
Instructions (+) 
CONTROL 
 
Mugshot  
Bias (+) 
Description 
Matched Lineup (-)
Lineup  
Instructions (+) 
Mugshot  
Bias (+) 
Description 
Matched Lineup (+) 
Lineup  
Instructions (-) 
4 Post Event 
Information (-) 
Accuracy 
Confidence (+) 
Trained  
Observers (+) 
Post Event 
Information (+) 
Accuracy 
Confidence (-) 
Trained  
Observers (+) 
Post Event 
Information (+) 
Accuracy 
Confidence (+) 
Trained  
Observers (+) 
CONTROL 
 
Post Event 
Information (+) 
Accuracy 
Confidence (+) 
Trained  
Observers (-) 
 
5 Confidence 
Malleability (-) 
Unconscious 
Transference (+) 
Exposure  
Time (+) 
Confidence 
Malleability (+) 
Unconscious 
Transference (-) 
Exposure Time (+) 
Confidence 
Malleability (+) 
Unconscious 
Transference (+) 
Exposure  
Time (-) 
Confidence 
Malleability (+) 
Unconscious 
Transference (+) 
Exposure  
Time (+) 
CONTROL 
(-) Negative or Misleading 
(+) Neutral/Positive 
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Table 6:  
 
An example of a trial transcript excerpt. The three identification topics are underlined and noted in bold. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
You are about to read an excerpt taken from transcripts of a trial where a defendant has been accused of robbing a 
bank at gunpoint. The following is direct testimony from the investigating police officer, Ryan Wilson, regarding an 
eyewitness. Officer Wilson has identified the defendant as the person he investigated and arrested for this crime. 
After you read the testimony please answer the questions that follow. 
 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. MCGILL (in progress): 
Q. Officer Wilson, you were the investigating officer for this alleged robbery of First Union Bank on January 2nd of 
this year? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you arrived on the scene, did you interview any eyewitnesses to the crime? 
A. Yes. Besides the bank teller, I interviewed Susan Davis, a customer. 
Stress (negative) 
Q. When you interviewed Ms. Davis what was her demeanor? 
A. Ms. Davis was quite rattled and stressed as she gave the description of the perpetrator. 
Q. Did Ms. Davis describe where she was standing in relation to the alleged perpetrator? 
A. Yes, she was the customer being serviced by the bank teller to the perpetrators immediate left. 
Q. What if anything drew Ms. Daviss attention to the alleged perpetrator? 
A. A flash of black metal caught her eye. 
Q. Did Ms. Davis tell you anything about a weapon? 
A. The witness said the perpetrator had a revolver. 
Weapon Focus (neutral/positive) 
Q. Was she able to give a detailed description of the revolver? 
A. Not really. Ms. Davis said she focused on the perpetrator, not the gun. 
Q. Why was the defendant a suspect for this crime? 
A. He matched the description given by Ms. Davis. 
Q. Was Ms. Davis able to later identify the defendant? 
A. Yes. Ms. Davis identified the defendant from a lineup consisting of the defendant and five other men. 
Lineup Fairness (neutral/positive) 
Q. How did you choose the other members of the lineup?  
A. The other members were selected because they matched the defendants race and they resembled the defendant.  
1. Based solely on the above testimony do you think the eyewitness is accurate or inaccurate? 
 
         1                  2                  3                  4                  5                  6                  7 
Very Confident              Very Confident 
   Inaccurate                                                                                                           Accurate 
 
2. What was the critical factor in reaching your decision for question #1? 
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 Procedure 
Subjects first evaluated the courtroom testimony packet. They were instructed to take the 
role of a juror evaluating courtroom testimony. Subjects were asked to read the description of 
each mock case and the transcript excerpt of testimony that followed. After reading the 
testimony they answered two questions. The first question asked them to rate the eyewitness as 
inaccurate or accurate on a 1 to 7 scale based solely on the testimony. The second question asked 
them to list the critical factor in reaching their decision to the first question. Subjects answered 
the questionnaire as soon as they completed the transcript packet. 
Results 
The first question in the transcript packet, which asked subjects to rate the eyewitness as 
accurate or inaccurate, was analyzed through a series of independent t tests. These tests revealed 
significant differences (p<. 05) between ratings for the eyewitnesses in the control versions and 
ratings for the eyewitnesses in the versions containing the following negative issues: stress, 
weapon focus, lineup fairness, alcoholic intoxication, mugshot induced bias, post event 
information, confidence malleability, unconscious transference, and exposure time. That is, 
subjects rated eyewitnesses in the control versions as significantly more accurate than the 
eyewitnesses in the experimental versions. Ratings for the eyewitnesses in the versions 
containing the following negative issues did not significantly differ from the ratings for the 
eyewitnesses in the control versions: cross race bias, showups, description matched lineups, and 
lineup instructions. That is, subjects did not rate the eyewitnesses in the control versions as more 
accurate than the eyewitnesses in the experimental versions. Ratings for the eyewitnesses in the 
versions with misleading topics (accuracy confidence correlation and trained observers) did not 
significantly differ from the control versions. That is subjects did not rate trained observers and 
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confident witnesses as more accurate than other witnesses (although means trended higher in the 
misleading version).  
For the second question in the transcript packet, which asked subjects to list the critical 
factor in reaching their decision to question one, proportions were calculated by coding correct 
responses (when the negative topic was mentioned) as 1 and omitted responses (when the 
negative topic was not mentioned) as 0. The percentage of times the negative topics were 
mentioned ranged for 0% (lineup instructions) to 93% (mugshot induced bias).   Two things 
should be noted about these percentages.  First, for a number of issues (e.g., the effect of stress), 
participants rated witnesses as less accurate than controls, yet only mentioned the effect of stress 
as being critical to their judgment 33% of the time.   Second, these percentages include situations 
where the participants mentioned the problematic topic as the critical factor even though they 
found the witness to be accurate in terms of their ratings. For example, some of the participants 
indicated the showup identification as the critical factor in finding the witness accurate.  Results 
from transcript packet questions are also shown in Table 7.  
Results from the questionnaire are presented in Table 8. By agreement of 80% or more 
students appear to have knowledge of the issues concerning stress, postevent information, 
alcoholic intoxication, and unconscious transference. Comparisons were made between 
performances on the survey to performances on the transcripts by excluding subjects that did not 
agree with the statements pertaining to the eyewitness memory issues on the survey. Therefore 
only those that agreed with the statements were included in the following analysis.  
A series of independent t-tests revealed that subjects who agreed with the statements on 
the survey followed the same pattern of results as reported above with the exception of the topic 
of alcohol intoxication which was significantly different from the control when all subjects were 
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Table 7 
  
Differences between ratings for the experimental versions and the ratings for the control versions.  Also, 
proportions of times the eyewitness identification issue was mentioned in question two. The values in 
parentheses are standard deviations. 
 
* p < .05, n=15 
 
included but failed to reach significance in this analysis. Therefore, subjects who endorsed the 
statements pertaining to stress, weapon focus, lineup fairness, mugshot induced bias, post event 
information, confidence malleability, unconscious transference, and exposure time as true on the 
survey accurately rated eyewitnesses in the control versions as significantly more accurate than 
                                      Transcript  Excerpts  
 
 
 
Topic 
 
Question #1 
Difference 
Scores 
 
Question #2 
 Topic Mentioned 
 
Alcohol Intoxication 1.07 (1.2)* 
 
87% 
Post Event Information 
 
1.06 (1.6)* 73% 
Stress 1.27 (1.4)* 
 
33% 
Unconscious Transference 
 
3.27 (1.7) * 80% 
Confidence Malleability 
 
3.53 (1.6)* 47% 
Showup -.80 (1.3) 
 
40% 
Lineup Instructions  
 
.27 (1.2) 0% 
Mugshot Bias 
 
1.87 (1.4)* 93% 
Cross Race Bias .14 (1.1) 
 
7% 
Accuracy-Confidence 
 
-.47 (1.2) 40% 
Weapon Focus 1.27 (1.6)* 
 
47% 
Exposure Time 
 
3.53 (1.4)* 73% 
Lineup Fairness .87 (.96)* 
 
33% 
Trained Observers 
 
-.60 (1.1) 53% 
Description Matched Lineup 
 
.33 (1.5) 27% 
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the eyewitnesses in these experimental versions. That is, students endorsed these statements as 
true on the survey and properly used that knowledge in their decision on the transcripts. 
However, subjects who endorsed the statements pertaining to cross race bias, showups, 
description matched lineups, alcoholic intoxication, and lineup instructions did not rate the 
eyewitnesses in the control versions as more accurate than the eyewitnesses in these 
experimental versions. That is, even students who endorsed these statements as true on the 
survey did not properly apply that knowledge in their decision on the transcripts. 
Table 8 
 
Percentages of student agreement with the topics on the  
questionnaire. 
  
Topic Students  
Agree Statement Is True 
% 
N = 60 
 
Alcoholic intoxication  
 
97 
Postevent information  88 
Stress  87 
Unconscious transference 85 
Confidence malleability 78 
Showup 77 
Lineup instructions 73 
Mug-shot-induced bias 65 
Cross-race bias 65 
Accuracy-confidence 63 
Weapon focus 53 
Exposure time 50 
Lineup Fairness 48 
Trained Observers 47 
Description Matched foils 43 
 
Discussion 
The results indicate that subjects were sensitive to 9 of the 15 issues in the context of 
courtroom testimony. Specifically, when the transcript excerpts contained these eyewitness 
identification issues in their negative form, subjects rated the eyewitness as less accurate than 
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when these issues were phrased in their positive form. Also the survey appears to accurately 
measure knowledge of some eyewitness memory issues but not others, in that when participants 
endorsed statements as true on the survey, they properly used that knowledge in their decision on 
the transcripts for some issues but not others. 
However, there are a number of limitations to the findings of this study.  First, although 
subjects did not rate trained observers and confident witnesses as more accurate than other 
witnesses (and thus these issues may not be problematic for jurors), this finding may be due to 
low statistical power on account of a small sample size. Therefore, in Experiment 2 sample size 
was increased in order to increase power. Second, because the answer choices on the transcripts 
differed from the answer choices on the survey, the only way to compare the two measures was 
to exclude subjects based on their responses on the survey. Because surveys are the most 
common method used to assess eyewitness memory knowledge it is important to compare these 
two measures on a similar scale in order to understand the relationship between stated knowledge 
on a survey and the ability to use this knowledge in the courtroom. Specifically, this comparison 
would help determine if the survey is a valid measure of potential jurors ability to use 
knowledge about eyewitness memory.  Third, participants may have appeared to be sensitive to 
these eyewitness identification issues because we compared the issues in their extreme forms 
(negative verses positive).  An omitted version, which does not refer to the topic, is needed in 
order to determine if subjects would rate the witnesses in the negative versions as less accurate 
than witnesses in the versions where the issue is not present. Also, question two of the answer 
sheet, which asked subjects to indicate the critical factor in reaching their decision for question 
one, was modified in order to allow subjects to indicate how critical factors influenced their 
decision (e.g. finding the witness accurate or inaccurate).  In Experiment 1, participants answers 
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were ambiguous as to whether they supported judgments of accuracy or inaccuracy. Thus, these 
changes to the format allow a more fine-grained assessment of subjects sensitivity to eyewitness 
memory issues. Experiment 2 addressed these issues. 
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Experiment 2 
Methods 
        Participants 
Three hundred and fifty-two undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology 
courses participated in this study. All subjects were volunteers and receive extra credit for their 
participation. 
        Materials 
 The packet of trial transcripts of courtroom testimony used in Experiment 1 was also used 
in this study with several modifications.  
Five versions of each excerpt were developed. Each excerpt contained testimony 
pertaining to two eyewitness identification topics instead of three. The number of topics 
examined in Experiment 1 was reduced from 15 to 10. For 9 of the 10 topics, the testimony 
regarding the eyewitness identification topics was in one of three forms: negative, 
neutral/positive, or omitted. When in the negative form, the information suggests that this 
specific aspect of the viewing conditions should (according to experts) negatively affect the 
accuracy of the eyewitness. When in the neutral/positive form the information suggests that this 
specific aspect of the viewing conditions was relatively ideal. When in the omitted form, the 
topic is not referred to. An example of the three forms of a topic is presented in table 9. 
For one of the topics, accuracy confidence correlation, the testimony was in one of three 
forms: misleading, neutral/positive, or omitted. When in the misleading form, the subjects may 
think the information suggests this specific aspect of the viewing condition increases the 
accuracy of the witness but (according to experts) it should not. When in the neutral/positive 
form, the subjects are not led to think this specific aspect has an effect on the accuracy of the 
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witness. When in the omitted form, the topic is not referred to. For example, in the misleading 
form subjects may think that a witness that expresses high confidence in their identification is 
more likely to be accurate than someone who does not express confidence even though research 
suggests this is not so.  
Table 9 
 
An example of the three forms of the topic post event information. 
Post Event Information 
 Testimony 
Negative Q. Did you talk to anyone about what you saw? 
A. Yes. Another witness and I discussed what the 
guy looked like before the police arrived. 
 
Neutral/Positive Q. Did you talk to anyone about what you saw? 
A. Only the police. They arrived very quickly and 
immediately separated the witnesses and told us not 
to discuss what had happened.  
 
Omitted Q. Did the police question you at the scene? 
A. Yes they questioned me at the scene and they 
brought me to the police station to answer a few 
more questions. 
 
 
In 1 of the 5 versions of each excerpt, testimony for both topics was omitted (considered 
the control version). For each of the other versions of each excerpt, testimony regarding one of 
the topics was negative, misleading, or positive and the other topic was in its omitted form. The 
design of the transcript excerpts is presented in Table 10. 
The questionnaire used in Experiment 1 was also modified for this study. The question 
and answer choices were changed to a 1 to 7 scale with 1 being very confident true and 7 being 
very confident false. The answer choices were modified in order to more easily compare 
performance on the survey to performance on the transcripts. Also the questionnaire contained 
26 of the 30 statements concerning the accuracy of eyewitness memory from Kassin et al (2001). 
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The additional statements served as filler information so that the 10 topics covered in the 
transcripts would not stand out. 
Table 10 
 
Design of the five transcript excerpts for Experiment 2 
Transcript 
Excerpts 
(Cases) 
Versions 
 Group A Group B Group C Group D Group E 
1 Exposure  
Time (+) 
Weapon  
Focus (o) 
 
Exposure  
Time (o) 
Weapon  
Focus (-) 
Exposure  
Time (-) 
Weapon  
Focus (o) 
Exposure  
Time (o) 
Weapon  
Focus (+) 
Exposure  
Time (o) 
Weapon  
Focus (o) 
CONTROL 
 
2 Cross Race  
Bias (o) 
Alcohol  
Intoxication (o) 
CONTROL 
 
Cross Race  
Bias (+) 
Alcohol 
Intoxication (o) 
Cross Race  
Bias (o) 
Alcohol  
Intoxication (+) 
Cross Race  
Bias (-) 
Alcohol  
Intoxication (o) 
Cross Race  
Bias (o) 
Alcohol 
Intoxication (-) 
3 Mugshot  
Bias (-) 
Lineup 
Instructions (o) 
 
Mugshot  
Bias (o) 
Lineup 
Instructions (o) 
CONTROL 
 
Mugshot  
Bias (o) 
Lineup 
Instructions (-) 
Mugshot  
Bias (+) 
Lineup 
Instructions (o) 
Mugshot  
Bias (o) 
Lineup 
Instructions (+) 
4 Post Event 
Information (+) 
Accuracy 
Confidence (o) 
Post Event 
Information (o) 
Accuracy 
Confidence (+) 
Post Event 
Information (o) 
Accuracy 
Confidence (o) 
CONTROL 
 
Post Event 
Information (-) 
Accuracy 
Confidence (o) 
Post Event 
Information (o) 
Accuracy 
Confidence (-) 
 
5 Confidence 
Malleability (-) 
Unconscious 
Transference (o) 
Confidence 
Malleability (o) 
Unconscious 
Transference (-) 
Confidence 
Malleability (+) 
Unconscious 
Transference (o) 
Confidence 
Malleability (o) 
Unconscious 
Transference (o) 
CONTROL 
Confidence 
Malleability (o) 
Unconscious 
Transference (+) 
(-) Negative 
(+) Neutral/Positive 
(o) Omitted 
        Procedure 
The procedure remained the same except that 300 subjects (60 per version) completed 
both the transcripts and the questionnaire and 52 subjects completed only the survey in order to 
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assess whether completing the transcript packet before answer the questionnaire, influenced 
subjects answers. 
Results 
Comparisons were made through a series of independent t-tests between the group that 
completed both the transcripts and the questionnaire and the control group that only completed 
the questionnaire and revealed no significant differences between the groups on the statements 
that were examined in the transcripts. Therefore the results from the questionnaire include all 
participants. Responses to the statements on the survey were coded as agree (selecting a 1 
through 3) or disagree (selecting a 4 through 7). The percentage of agreement ranged from 
90% (alcohol intoxication) to 36% (accuracy-confidence). Results from the questionnaire are 
presented in Table 11. 
Table 11 
 
Percentages of student agreement (N = 352) with the topics on the questionnaire.   
Topic  
% Agree Statement Is True 
 
 
 
Average Rating Response 
 
Alcoholic intoxication  
 
90 
 
1.94 
Confidence malleability 74 2.79 
Mug-shot-induced bias 73 2.96 
Postevent information  72 2.99 
Lineup instructions 69 2.96 
Exposure time 57 3.37 
Unconscious transference 56 3.39 
Weapon focus 56 3.51 
Cross-race bias 51 3.64 
Accuracy-confidence 36 4.12 
 
Are subjects sensitive to topics when evaluating trial testimony? 
In order to examine participants knowledge of eyewitness memory, the first question in 
the transcript packet, which asked subjects to rate the eyewitness as accurate or inaccurate, was 
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analyzed through a series of One-way ANOVAs. These tests were significant by transcript 
version for some topics: exposure time, F (2,177) = 16.91, MSE =25.67, unconscious 
transference, F (2, 177) = 48.31, MSE = 86.87, post event information, F (2, 177) = 8.89, MSE = 
18.20, confidence malleability, F (2, 177) = 15.63, MSE = 28.42, alcohol intoxication, F (2, 177) 
= 41.46, MSE = 56.02, and mugshot bias  F (2, 177) = 4.32, MSE = 10.55 . Followup Tukey 
HSD tests revealed significant differences (p<. 05) between ratings for the eyewitnesses in the 
negative versions and ratings for the eyewitnesses in the control and neutral/positive versions for 
the topics exposure time, unconscious transference, and confidence malleability. That is, subjects 
rated eyewitnesses in the control and neutral/positive versions as significantly more accurate than 
the eyewitnesses in these negative versions. Ratings for the eyewitnesses in the control and 
neutral/positive versions did not differ for these topics. 
 Ratings for the eyewitness in the neutral/positive version containing the mugshot bias 
topic significantly differed from the ratings for the eyewitnesses in the negative and control 
versions.  That is, subjects rated eyewitnesses in the control and negative versions as 
significantly less accurate than the eyewitness in the neutral/positive version. Ratings for the 
eyewitnesses in the control and negative versions did not differ for this topic. 
Ratings for the eyewitness in the negative version containing the post event information 
topic significantly differed from the ratings for the eyewitness in the neutral/positive version but 
not the control version.  That is, subjects rated the eyewitness in the negative version as 
significantly less accurate than the eyewitness in the neutral/positive version. Ratings for the 
eyewitnesses in the neutral/positive and control versions did not differ for this topic. 
Ratings for the eyewitnesses in all versions containing the topic alcohol intoxication 
significantly differed. That is, subjects rated the eyewitness in the negative version as 
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significantly less accurate than the eyewitness in the neutral/positive version, which was rated 
significantly less accurate than the eyewitness in the control version.  
 Ratings for the eyewitnesses in the versions containing the following negative issues did 
not significantly differ from the ratings for the eyewitnesses in the control and neutral/positive 
versions: weapon focus, F (2, 177) = .439, MSE = .772, cross race bias, F (2, 177) = 2.80, MSE 
= 4.88, and lineup instructions F (2, 174) = 1.95, MSE = 4.31. That is, subjects did not rate the 
eyewitnesses in the control and neutral/positive versions as more accurate than the eyewitnesses 
in the negative versions.  
Ratings for the eyewitnesses in the version with the misleading topic (accuracy 
confidence correlation) did not significantly differ from the control and neutral/positive versions. 
That is, subjects did not rate confident witnesses as more accurate than other witnesses.  
Results from the first question in the transcript packet are presented in Table 12. 
Are subjects who agree with a topic on the survey more likely to appropriately evaluate 
trial testimony on that topic? 
In order to examine the relationship between the survey and the transcripts, the two 
measures was analyzed through a series of 2 (agree or disagree with survey statements) x 3 
(negative, neutral/positive, or control version) ANOVAs on each topic (with the exception of the 
transcript and survey statement containing the alcohol intoxication topic because there were not 
enough subjects in the disagree group to compare statistically).  There was no significant effect 
of statement (agree or disagree) on any topic with Fs (1, 174) = .001 to 3.175. That is, subjects 
who indicated that they agreed with the statements on the survey did not rate the eyewitnesses in 
the negative versions as less accurate than those that did not agree with the statement on the 
survey. However, there was a significant interaction between statement and version for the post 
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event information topic. A test of simple effects showed subjects that agreed (M= 5.26) and 
subjects that disagreed (M=4.24) with the post event information statement on the survey 
significantly differed on their ratings for the eyewitnesses in the negative post event information 
version, F (1, 58) = 4.51, MSE = 12.69.  That is, subjects that disagreed with the statement rated 
the eyewitness in the negative version as less accurate than the subjects that agreed with the 
statement. Note that this finding is opposite to the predicted direction. 
Table 12 
 
Proportions of ratings for question one of the transcripts. The values in parentheses are 
standard deviations. 
 Transcript Version 
 
 
 
Topic 
 
 Negative 
     (-) 
 
Neutral/Positive 
          (+) 
 
     Control 
(both omitted) 
Alcohol Intoxication 3.67 (1.1) b  
 
5.55 (1.2) a 4.98 (1.3) c 
Confidence Malleability 
 
4.45 (1.6) b  5.72 (1.2) a 5.55 (1.2) a 
Mugshot Bias 
 
4.15 (1.6) b 4.90 (1.6) a 4.20 (1.5) b 
 
Post Event Information 
 
4.97 (1.7) b  6.07 (1.0) a 5.57 (1.5) a b 
Lineup Instructions  
 
4.62 (1.5) 4.70 (1.5) 4.20 (1.5) 
Exposure Time 
 
4.20 (1.4) b  5.47 (1.1) a 5.12 (1.2) a 
Unconscious Transference 
 
3.27 (1.6) b  5.07 (1.2) a 5.55 (1.2) a 
Weapon Focus 4.90 (1.5) 
 
5.07 (1.3) 5.12 (1.2) 
Cross Race Bias 4.52 (1.5) 
 
5.03 (1.2) 4.98 (1.3) 
Accuracy-Confidence 
 
5.97 (1.2) 5.95 (1.0) 5.57 (1.5) 
Means with different subscripts indicate significant differences. 
p<.05 
 
Because there were not enough subjects in the disagree group to analyze in a 2 x 3 
ANOVA, the transcript and survey statement containing the alcohol intoxication topic were 
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compared by first excluding subjects that did not agree with the statement pertaining to alcohol 
intoxication on the survey. Therefore only those that agreed with the statement were included in 
the analysis. This reduced the sample size from 180 to 157. A one-way ANOVA on ratings was 
significant by version, F(2,154) = 39.16, MSE = 53.62. A followup Tukey HSD test showed that 
the ratings for the eyewitness in the neutral/positive (M=5.52) and the control (M=5.00) versions 
significantly differed from the ratings in the negative version (M=3.61). That is, students that 
endorsed this statement as true on the survey correctly rated the eyewitness in the negative 
version as less accurate than the eyewitnesses in the control and the neutral/positive versions. 
Ratings for the neutral/positive version and the control version did not differ.  
Are subjects answers on the survey correlated with their answers on the trial testimony? 
To examine further the relationship between survey responses and transcript ratings, 
correlations were first run between the ratings for the negative and neutral/positive versions and 
responses to the survey statements and revealed no significant correlations between the two 
measures. We then reverse coded the ratings for the negative and neutral/positive versions and 
examined them together in order to increase sample size to increase the chance of detecting a 
correlation if present. We found a significant negative correlation between the ratings for the 
alcohol intoxication transcript (M=3.40) and the alcohol intoxication statement (M=2.00),  
r = -.202. That is, as the ratings for the eyewitness in the transcripts increases (towards finding 
the witness accurate), the responses to the survey statement decreases (towards finding the 
witness inaccurate).  No other correlations were significant.  Finally, ANCOVAs were run for 
each transcript topic using survey ratings for a given topic as a covariate.  None of the analyses 
revealed a significant effect of the covariate.  Thus, based on the ANOVA, ANCOVA and 
correlational analyses, it appears there is weak or little relationship between beliefs expressed on 
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each issue on an eyewitness memory survey and evaluation of eyewitness testimony where each 
issues was present.  Thus, knowing a given persons response on a survey topic was not 
predictive of whether he/she would be able to correctly evaluate a witness whose testimony 
should be affected that factor. 
Are overall responses on the survey predictive of overall evaluation of trial testimony?  
As noted above, correlations between individual responses to survey topics and 
performance on the transcripts were not significant.  However, it is possible that aggregate 
performance on survey topics is predictive of which topics participants are likely to be sensitive 
to when evaluating the transcripts.  Thus, a correlation was computed between the mean 
agreement on the 10 topics on the survey with the difference between the ratings of the 
neutral/positive and the negative versions.   The analysis revealed a strong positive correlation 
that did not reach significance due to small sample size r(9) = .556, p =.079. Although this 
correlation was not statistically significant, statistical power is an issue and knowing how 
participants did overall on a survey topic accounted for a considerable amount of variance (r2= 
.31) in predicting the topics to which participants were sensitive in the trial transcripts. For 
example, for two of the issues that the participants did not discriminate between the different 
versions of the transcripts (weapon focus and cross race bias) the statements regarding these 
issues on the survey also generated the least agreement.  
Do subjects mention the appropriate factor after evaluating trial testimony?  
For the second question in the transcript packet, which asked subjects to list the critical 
factor in reaching their decision to question one, proportions were calculated by coding correct 
responses (when the topic was correctly mentioned when finding the witness 
accurate/inaccurate) as 1, omitted responses (when the topic was not mentioned) as 0, and 
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incorrect responses (when the topic was incorrectly mentioned when finding the witness 
accurate/inaccurate) as -1. The percentage of correct mentions of the topics ranged for 0% to 
87%. The percentage of incorrect mentions of the topics ranged for 0% to 52%. The percentage 
of times the topics were omitted ranged for 0% to 100%. Overall, participants rarely mentioned 
the topic as influencing their decision in the opposite direction, but often did not mention the 
factor at all. When phrased in the negative most did not include the topic as a reason for finding 
the witness accurate, except for the issues regarding post event information, weapon focus, and 
the accuracy confidence correlation. For example, 28% of the time participants indicated that 
they found the witness to be accurate because the witness received post event information from 
other witnesses. Further, when the transcript is positive, people often do not include that 
information even for issues to which they appear sensitive. Results for the second question are 
shown in Table 13.  
In order to determine if the ratings for the eyewitnesses differed for participants that 
correctly mentioned the critical factor versus those that omitted the critical factor, comparisons 
were made between the two groups through a series of independent samples t tests.  The focus of 
these analyses was on performance in the negative versions of the transcripts.  These analyses 
revealed significant differences between the groups in their ratings for the eyewitnesses for the 
topics confidence malleability, t (45) = -4.56, mugshot bias, t (45) = -3.85, weapon focus, t (40) = 
-3.76 and post event information, t (41) =  -4.60. That is, subjects that correctly mentioned the 
critical factor rated the eyewitness as significantly less accurate than those that omitted the 
critical factor.   
 However, the two groups did not differ in their ratings for the eyewitnesses in the 
negative versions for the topics exposure time, t (55) = -.991 and unconscious transference, t (41) 
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=  -1.06. The topics alcohol intoxication, lineup instructions, cross race bias, and accuracy 
confidence were not included in this analysis because there were not enough subjects in the 
correctly mentioned group to compare statistically.  Although these analyses were exploratory, 
the results suggest that for some (but not all) topics, participants are explicitly aware of the factor 
that impacts their assessment of eyewitness accuracy.     
 
 
 
Table 13 
 
Proportions of responses for question two of the transcripts. 
  
Negative/Misleading 
(-) 
 
 
Neutral/Positive 
(+) 
 
Topic 
1 0 -1 1 0 -1 
 
Alcohol Intoxication 
 
 
87 
 
13 
 
0 
 
30 
 
70 
 
0 
Confidence Malleability 
 
43 52 5 27 72 2 
Mugshot Bias 
 
52 45 3 45 53 2 
Post Event Information 
 
47 25 28 30 70 0 
Lineup Instructions  
 
10 90 0 18 78 3 
Exposure Time 
 
73 22 5 45 55 0 
Unconscious Transference 
 
55 45 0 27 73 0 
Weapon Focus 
 
38 40 22 13 87 0 
Cross Race Bias 
 
0 100 0 0 100 0 
Accuracy-Confidence 
 
0 48 52 12 88 0 
 1 The topic was correctly mentioned for finding the witness accurate/inaccurate. 
 0 The topic was not mentioned. 
-1 The topic was incorrectly mentioned for finding the witness accurate/inaccurate. 
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Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 indicate that participants were sensitive to the issues 
regarding exposure time, alcohol intoxication, unconscious transference, post event information, 
and confidence malleability in the context of mock courtroom testimony. Specifically, when the 
transcript excerpts contained these eyewitness identification issues in their negative form, 
participants rated the eyewitness as less accurate than when these issues were phrased in their 
positive form or when the topic was omitted. Participants were also sensitive to the issue 
regarding post event information and mugshot bias when the topics were in  their extreme forms 
(negative verses neutral/positive).   
In addition, participants did not rate highly confident witnesses as more accurate than 
witnesses who were portrayed as having less confidence (or for which confidence information 
was omitted). Therefore, participants were not susceptible to this eyewitness identification issue.   
In one respect, these findings suggest that expert testimony on these issues may not meet the 
second criterion of admissibility because it would not assist the triers of fact (assuming that the 
sensitivity noted above is at an optimal level for a given factor).   However, it is less clear that 
these results suggest the knowledge is common sense to jurors in that they do not necessarily 
endorse these beliefs on a survey or convey them when justifying their ratings.  Participants did 
not appear to be sensitive to issues such as the cross race bias, weapon focus, and lineup 
instructions in that their ratings did not differ by transcript version.  
Participants stated beliefs on each issue on the survey did not predict how they would 
behave when evaluating a witness where these eyewitness identification issues were present. 
Correlations between survey responses on a given topic and responses on the transcripts were not 
statistically significant (except one weak correlation in a direction contrary to the hypothesis). 
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Also, there were no differences in ratings on the transcripts between those that agreed and 
disagreed with the statements on the survey.  However, overall beliefs on the survey were 
strongly correlated with performance on the transcripts (although this analysis did not reach 
significance due to low statistical power).  Based on this finding it is concluded that although the 
survey may not be a good measure for predicting individual performance, it may predict which 
issues are likely to be most problematic for the majority of jurors. Therefore, if the goal of 
assessing eyewitness memory knowledge is to know what a particular juror will do when faced 
with a particular issue, then the survey may not be effective. However, if the goal is to determine 
overall which issues are most likely to cause difficulty for potential jurors then survey measures 
may have some utility. However surveys are limited in that you are forced to rely on descriptive 
statistics, such as frequency information, when determining what issues are potential problems 
for jurors and thus it is ultimately left to the researcher to determine what criterion an issue needs 
to reach in order to be significant.  
Although participants were sensitive to the issues in terms of how they rated the 
eyewitnesses, they did not always list the correct issues as the reason why they made their 
decision. Therefore, in some cases even though participants ratings are appropriately sensitive to 
the described witnessing conditions, they are often unable to state the correct reason why they 
rated the witness as accurate or inaccurate.  Further, for three issues participants indicated the 
impairing factor as a reason for finding the witness accurate. This dissociation between 
performance and explicit knowledge could possible lead to errors when deliberating with fellow 
jurors. For example, a juror may independently make the correct decision as to the accuracy of 
an eyewitness but when they meet with other jurors they give the wrong reason why they made 
their decision and subsequently lead others astray. For example, for the issue regarding the 
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accuracy confidence correlation, ratings for the different versions did not differ, but 52% 
indicated that they found the witness accurate based on the fact that they were highly confident. 
Therefore, if these witnesses were to discuss this incorrect reason for their decision with others, 
then they could influence others with this incorrect information. Further research is needed to 
explore how the jury deliberation process might influence judgments made about the accuracy of 
eyewitness testimony.          
The results of transcript performance for Experiment 2 were consistent with Experiment 
1 with the exception of the issue of weapon focus. In Experiment 1, ratings for the negative and 
neutral/positive versions significantly differed, however, in Experiment 2, the ratings for the 
different versions did not significantly differ. This could be due to a slight modification of the 
neutral/positive version in Experiment 2.  In Experiment 1, the weapon was mentioned in the 
neutral/positive version but the weapon was not mentioned in the neutral/positive version in 
Experiment 2. Overall, the transcript results of Experiment 1 were replicated for the subset of 
issues investigated in both experiments. 
However, the pattern of agreement with the statements from the survey in Experiment 2 
was inconsistent with Experiment 1.  Specifically, there was a relationship between survey 
response and transcript performance for a number of issues in Experiment 1, but there was no 
significant relationship between these measures for any topic in Experiment 2.  It is not clear 
which single factor is responsible for this finding.  Some of the transcripts in Experiment 2 were 
modified from Experiment 1, and answers on the survey were given on a response scale rather 
than simply agree/disagree.  Further, there were sample differences. Experiment 1 participants 
consisted of psychology students in an upper level psychology course that may have been 
exposed to these eyewitness identification issues in their course work. Experiment 2 consisted of 
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students enrolled in an introductory psychology course. Thus, one reason for the difference could 
be differences in relevant knowledge.   At this point, it is not clear which factor (or combination) 
is responsible for the discrepant results.     
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General Discussion 
Previous research has relied heavily on survey responses as an assessment of eyewitness 
memory knowledge. The results of both experiments highlight the strengths and weaknesses of 
this measure.  Perhaps the most important finding of the current study is that a survey response 
for a given issue is not necessarily predictive of a persons ability to account for that factor when 
assessing the reliability of an eyewitness. Specifically, participants who endorsed a belief in the 
truth of a given factor on a survey did not rate witnesses whose performance should be 
negatively impacted by that factor differently in the transcripts than those who indicated that they 
did not believe that the given factor should impact eyewitness memory. This finding suggests 
that surveys may not be the optimal way to assess how a particular juror will respond to an issue 
in the context of trial testimony. However, a second question is whether large-scale surveys 
predict the eyewitness issues that would be problematic for jurors when evaluating testimony.  
The substantial (albeit statistically nonsignificant) correlation between overall performance on 
the surveys and the transcripts suggests that this is the case.  Thus, knowing that there is greater 
agreement on a given issue is predictive of whether participants will be able to appropriately 
modify their assessments of witnesses.  Finally, whether assessed by survey or by transcript, 
potential jurors appear to have knowledge of a number of issues that eyewitness memory experts 
agree are important and scientifically validated. Taken alone, this suggests that there are a 
number of factors for which expert testimony does not meet the second criterion of admissibility 
in that it would not assist the trier(s) of fact (because they already hold consistent beliefs).  
However, there are a number of issues that need to be clarified by future research before such a 
conclusion can be made.  For example, although the differences between negative and control 
transcripts were statistically significant, it is not entirely clear if this sensitivity would be 
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meaningful in real-life cases.  Further, it is not known whether the presence of expert testimony 
would further sensitize potential jurors to these issues, or simply make them more skeptical of all 
eyewitness testimony.  What is clear is that participants appear to be sensitive to a number of 
eyewitness memory issues in ways that would not have been entirely predicted by previous 
survey research.  The implications of this finding await further study.  
The finding that expressed beliefs are not predictive of actual behavior is not a new 
finding in psychology. This dissociation between what people say and what people do is quite 
common. Research in the social psychology literature has repeatedly shown that expressed 
attitudes are not always predictive of behavior. For example, in the classic study by LaPiere 
(1934) on prejudice, he found that people who verbally expressed, on a questionnaire, that they 
would never serve or accommodate someone of Japanese decent were found to behave just the 
opposite way when a Japanese couple came to their place of business.  
Furthermore, in this study we found that participants that did well on the transcripts could 
not always give the correct reason for their decisions. Likewise, in the explicit/implicit learning 
literature, a common finding is that people are not always able to accurately articulate the bases 
for their performance (Reber, 1989). Therefore, the results of this study are consistent with a vast 
psychological literature that suggests that peoples explicit knowledge is not always predictive of 
how they behave. 
There are several limitations to generalizing the conclusions of this study. First, this is the 
first study of its kind that developed testimony around eyewitness identification issues that 
experts agree merit testimony and we only examined a subset of these issues. Therefore, other 
issues need to be investigated in this manner in order to determine if people are sensitive to these 
issues when encountered in the context of mock testimony. In addition, the participants were 
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undergraduates in an introductory psychology course, and therefore it would be prudent to 
determine if the results generalize to juror-eligible adults from other demographic or geographic 
backgrounds.  
Second, the generalizability of the transcript results to real-life jurors rests on the 
assumption that attorneys ask the correct questions of witnesses that, in turn, elicit a response 
highlights these eyewitness memory issues. If the proper questions are not asked then this 
information may not be mentioned in the testimony and jurors will not detect this issue as a 
problem. For example, the transcript regarding post event information included the attorney 
asking the question Did you talk to anyone about what you saw? If the attorney did not ask this 
question then the fact that the witness discussed what happened with other witnesses would 
never be revealed in the testimony. Therefore, an important question is whether attorneys are 
familiar enough with these eyewitness identification issues to ask the appropriate questions. If 
not, then an appropriate role for eyewitness memory experts would be assisting attorneys in 
questioning witnesses.  
Another potential concern is that even though participants are making the correct decision 
on some of these issues individually that does not mean that their decision will remain the same 
after deliberation with other jurors. That is, if jurors cannot identify the reason why they are 
making their decision then they may be susceptible to the influence of others. For example, if the 
participants in this study were to discuss the case and reach one verdict then the participants that 
indicated that they found the witness to be accurate because the witness received post event 
information from other witnesses may discuss this incorrect information and lead others to find 
the witness accurate based on this information. If that is the case then an eyewitness memory 
expert may be needed to explain these issues to the jury so that they will be able to verbalize why 
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they made their decisions. Therefore if an expert was present to discuss the problem with post 
event information then jurors would not be affected by this incorrect information coming from 
other jurors.  
In conclusion, the importance of assessing eyewitness memory knowledge is to determine 
how jurors will evaluate a flawed eyewitness account in the context of courtroom testimony. A 
potential advantage of using the transcripts designed for this study as a measure is that the 
transcripts measure eyewitness memory knowledge in a context that is much closer to what 
jurors would encounter in a courtroom. Furthermore, the results of this study shed light on the 
problem of using surveys to assess eyewitness memory knowledge since the survey responses 
did not predict an individuals performance on this more face valid measure.  
Although surveys may be beneficial in assessing overall knowledge of eyewitness 
memory, in a given case, this may not be necessary. That is, for a specific case not all eyewitness 
memory factors will be relevant. Therefore, given the current findings, survey results may inform 
the court regarding which issues might be problematic for jurors but they are limited in that they 
dont tell which issues will be problematic for a specific juror. In addition, survey results are 
limited in that you can only obtain frequency information and therefore it is up to the researcher 
to determine where to draw the line when determining if an issue is a problem among jurors.  
Therefore, in a real world setting, although the survey may be more appropriate to use 
when determining overall what people know about eyewitness memory, the transcripts may be a 
more appropriate measure to assess knowledge for the issues specific to the case at hand. 
Specifically survey responses did not accurately predict how a given participant would do on a 
particular issue and this is what would be important for a specific case. For example, in a 
particular case, if the only problem with an eyewitnesss identification is that the witness 
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discussed what had happened with others prior to being interviewed then it would only be 
important to know what jurors know about the issue regarding post event information and not 
overall knowledge of eyewitness memory. Since the transcripts more accurately simulate how 
jurors are actually exposed to these issues, it is argued that performance on this measure is likely 
to be a more accurate representation of knowledge of each issue.  Therefore, the measure 
developed for this study may be more beneficial than the survey to those conducting research for 
a specific case (e.g., jury simulations).  
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